the place of the narrating subject and in the discourse of interpretation. (Sterne would no doubt have had a parodic turn at the descriptive vocabulary currently available to us.) In summary, Tristram Shandy, that novel in which the narrator seems always in search of inventing the conditions in which he can invent himself, in its duplicitous compact with the reader anticipates the analytic dialogue itself.
Superficial similarities are all too easy to enumerate in comparing Lacan's "return to Freud" with Stern's isolated performance: the word play and mots d'esprit, the rhetorical games and parodic appropriations, the calculated lapses and sylleptic conjunctions. But in a more pervasive sense Tristram Shandy addresses topics central to Lacan's enterprise; it is an extended meditation on thwarted paternity and its consequences, on a theory of reading that attends to the subversive possibilities of signification, on protoFreudian topics like the primal scene, castration, and verbal wit, and supremely on a comic narrative that elaborates the cross-implications of sexuality and language-inscribed under the sign of the death's head. It is a novel rising from the symbolic triad of the family. As a most peculiar case history it can be seen as either a congeries of symptoms or a narrative: the history of desire manifested through language. it is also a novel of wounds, scars, and manque (Uncle Toby, we need hardly be reminded, was "wounded in language"). Most of all it is a system of marks and repressions that offer a model for contemporary analysis of the situation and temporality of the subject.
THE ABSENT FATHER
I know that it will be said, continued my father (availing himself of the Prolepsis) that in itself, and simply taken-like hunger, or thirst, or sleep-'tis an affair neither good or bad-or shameful or otherwise.
-Tristram Shandy, IX, 33
For a novel haunted by so many gaps and discontinuities, Tristram Shandy appears to be a work remarkably precise about its narrator's point of origin. The narrator ignores the wisdom of the ancients and, while misquoting Horace, asserts that he will begin "ab Ovo." The exemplary precision with which Tristram alleges to establish the moment of his conception introduces the anecdote of the senior Shandys and the clock; and in a narrative in which sex and temporality are so intertwined, this has a certain initial aptness. Further, it is on the most cursory examination, in a novel so gov-erned by the rhetorical figure of aposiopesis, but the first of many interruptions that will punctuate the work with maddening ingenuity.
Having excused all save the "curious and inquisitive," Tristram "shuts the door" in chapter 4 and asserts with an uncharacteristic lack of ambiguity, "I was begot in the night, betwixt the first Sunday and the first Monday, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighteen. I am positive I was." (I, 4) He then describes the monthly regularity of Walter's connubial and horological duties (always discharged "on the first Sunday night of every month throughout the whole year," adding, however, that he had remained chaste through December, January, and February while laid up with a Sciatica, and that he had departed for London on March 25th, where he remained until "the second week of the May following." This would seem to fix the night of Tristram's conception with some exactitude. He drives the final nail in the first sentence of the next chapter: "On the fifth day of November, 1718, which to the aera fixed on, was as near nine kalendar months as any husband could in reason have expected, was I Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, brought forth into this scurvy and disasterous world of ours. (I, 5; second italics added) This is a precision that opens a considerable gap, since by any arithmetic the figure adds up to eight months, and here as elsewhere in the novel the point is made that Tristram was a term baby.
I have earlier argued that the novel thus begins with a considerable meconnaissance, one that is glossed at various critical points throughout the narrative.3 In the opening pages the relationship of the father to the symbolic triad of the family is already one of absence. The insistence on the precise calculation of Tristram's putative gestation also forces the reader back to a re-reading of the riddle that concludes the first chapter: "Did ever woman since the creation of the world, interrupt a man with such a silly question? Pray, what was your father saying?
Nothing." (I, 1) It now appears that he was accomplishing nothing as well, although possessed by words. (Lacan offers an appropriate marginal comment in "Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanlyse": "Through the word-already a presence made of absence-absence itself comes to giving itself a name in the moment of origin.") The signs of Tristram's unrelatedness to Walter physically abound in the chapters that follow his ultimate arrival in the world; yet absent in the "first scene" (which is also absent from the book), Walter does assume with his language-haunted theories of pedagogy and his doctrine of names the role of the nom-du-pere. Writing of Telemakhos' predicament in the Odyssey, Robert Con Davis observes, "Instituted by the discovery of absence, the desire for the father will be articulated in what is essentially a narrative."4 Walter's role in the narrative is thus generated out of "nothing" but it serves, from the mangled naming of Tristram on through his other misadventures, as constitutive of the symbolic order of language.
There is, however, within the narrative another character who in terms of appearance, temperament, and status as author has a larger claim on the role of Tristram's natural father. This is the character whose name Sterne actually purloins for the signature of his other works, parson Yorick. And, like his precursor in Shakespeare's play, he presides over much of the action of the narrative from the grave-and yet, in Tristram Shandy's last chapter, when Walter and his wife once again come together in a discussion of perplexed paternity (IX, 33), he has the last words of the book. Two passages from the chapters between these first and last will perhaps serve for a summary of Walter's absence and Yorick's involvement. Thus from the middle of the novel one of the shorter chapters in Book IV in its entirety, where the question of the mother's relation to her child has earlier been in learned dispute: CHAPTER XXX -And pray, said my uncle Toby, leaning upon Yorick, as he and my father were helping him leisurely down the stairs-don't be terrified, madam, this stair-case conversation is not so long as the last-And pray, Yorick, said my uncle Toby, which way is this said affair of Tristram at length settled by these learned men? Very satisfactorily, replied Yorick; no mortal, Sir, has any concern with it-for Mrs. Shandy the mother is nothing at all a-kin to him-and as the mother's is the surest sideMr. Shandy, in course, is still less than nothing In short, he is not as much a-kin to him, Sir, as I am. Walter's attachment to language and to the erection of new linguistic theories cannot, of course, be silenced by such momentary defeats as these, any more that Toby's campaigning and efforts at precise representation can be terminated by his wound. Walter would seek to order the articulation of the "auxiliary verbs" with the same passion that Toby would seek to keep pace with the wars in Flanders. In a world of radical unrelatedness they both strive for some symbolic stay against disorder.
THE PURLOINED SERMON
-Here are two senses, cried Eugenius, as we walk'd along, pointing with the fore finger of his right hand to the word Crevice, in the fiftysecond page of the second volume of this book of books....
-Tristram Shandy, III, 33
Authors and their critics, analysts and analysands, must all attend to the strategies of reading and to the challenges that they raise. Tristram Shandy is a novel, perhaps above all others, that concerns itself with the reciprocal and highly suspect relations of author and reader. The reader is here again and yet again invited to participate in the subversive act of the book's creation, to uncover the sub-text of the repressed read under the gaze of the Unconscious. And the signature of the author or his surrogate, insofar as he is embodied as a character within the book albeit a dead character (who may, as I have argued, have begot the narrator himself), is "read" by his own creations. We are reminded again and again that the reader's "mind" is not an independent entity; it exists and is constituted within language, which is itself a shared experience described by the symbolic triangle. The strategy of "Slawkenbergius' Tale" should be enough to catechize any reader about the limits of his autonymy.
Trim, but one of many eccentric readers within the novel, was caught by Hogarth in his plate for the second edition as the Corporal adjusted himself to the "laws of gravity" (physical and rhe-torical) and began to read that text of a sermon just fallen from a copy of Stevinus (II, 15). But what is the text that Trim begins, twice, to read? We learn that it is a sermon from the pen of Yorick, who has been memorialized some chapters earlier by the famous "black page," an invitation to mourn and a literal representation of that beance opened by death and ink. At least it seems to be Yorick's work, since Walter Shandy definitely recognizes his "stile and manner." And yet the authorship of the text within a text is further confounded, since the narrator tells us that this very sermon was "preach'd at an assize, in the cathedral of York, before a thousand witnesses, ready to give on oath of it, by a certain prebendary of that church, and actually printed by him when he had done,-and within so short a space as two years and three months after Yorick's death." (II, 18) "Yorick's death" is doubly ambiguous, since he is in one intertextual sense already dead and decayed when Hamlet's antecedent drama begins. Yorick as the presence of an absence is surely the most famous talking skull in literary history.
The But the preacher's text itself is a commentary on text that further impinges on the act of reading and, behind that, on the very act of self-apprehension: "For we trust we have a good Conscience" (Hebrews, 13:18). Within the polysemous weave of Sterne's narrative, the reader is invited to read with the fictional readers, to supply the final identification of yet another author, and to participate in the complex game of literary creation out of the "dead letter" (or "l'etre mort"). The sermon, then, is read in Yorick's absence and demonstrates the impossibility of a self-contained moral discourse, despite its title: conscience cannot supply the true referent of morality but is rather the voice of desire and self-interest. Revelation, established religion thus seems to be required, but this, too, like the sermon itself, must be read and so is subject to conditions that no referential discourse can master.
Within the text of Yorick's (Sterne's) sermon, with all its dubieties about the assurance of our own "conscience," there are yet other invitations to confirm or correct our self-awareness through reading: "How readest thou?" he asks by way of qualification of the individual conscience. The preacher's tolle lege invites the sinner to test his conscience, like that "British judge" appealed to in the chauvinistic peroration, against that "which he knows already written." The appeal to the historical, judicial audience is obvious, but so is the paradox of a Common Law that is not exactly "already written" as statute but rather is intertextually dispersed as a continuing process of opinion and commentary; a similar paradox attends biblical authority: in the "already written" where does That which is "hidden" in Sterne's novel lies in time somewhere between the infinite possibilities of the Mallarmean blank page (VI, 38) and the final, finitely determined "black one" that concludes Yorick's ambiguous career. All of the narrator's desperate will to live is concentrated on keeping the story going, the digressions exfoliating, before the final closure of that memorial black page. And yet, to continue the reading of the passage above (where "the black one" is conventionally taken to refer to Satan), it is the marbled page that becomes "motley emblem" of the work. For it is in the space between the printer's marbled pages of the physical book that the act of reading-and of constitution of a subject-transpires. More exactly, in terms of "Freud's masterplot," through detours and repetitions, the novel's conclusion finally attains its beginning in the words of the dead Yorick.
Within this potential space Sterne claims two consciousnesses must be at work in relation to a third element, language; and morethe repositioning of reader and author opens the operations of the repressed material to the game: a PacMan system of relationships between manifest and repressed discourses. Their shaping collaboration, within the shifting networks and misapprehensions of the novel, must remain both active and passive. Speaking of the gap between what any author can say and what his reader must supply, Sterne insists "the truest respect which you can pay to the reader's understanding is to halve this matter amicably, and leave [the reader] something to imagine, in his turn, as well as yourself." (II, 11) All the rest is more than half.
Sterne is too well aware that the reader's imagination can be specular, illusory, and digressive as well as veridical and progressive. What follows the marbled page is, in fact, the elaborately sophistical preamble to "Slawkenbergius' Tale." And the tale itself, after the bookish interruption between volumes III and IV, proceeds in the double key of its punning Latin and Shandy pere's erratic English translation, serving to destroy the autonomy of the written word itself. The word "nose," like "whiskers" in the "dangerous chapter" of Book V or Toby's "proper end of woman," suffers a "wound." It eludes the "intended" use despite all the author's protestations and abortive attempts at definition: "For by the word Nose, throughout all this long chapter of noses, and in every other part of my work, where the word Nose occurs-I declare, by that word I mean a Nose, and nothing more or less." (The operative word here may be "nothing.") But for the obsessed imagination, whether of Walter Shandy or of the book's reader, the word "nose" can never again signify quite that.
The act of reading takes place, then, in time, a time in which the players move toward death, in which the symbolic order in which the "world" is "created" rests on absence and death: it is erected between the dead determinations or ellipses of the text and the living responses of the reader. As John Dewey observed, in a Shandean vein, without the act of recreation the text cannot be inhabited as a work of art. The reader supplies, from clues within the text, the temporal dimensions of anticipation and memory. But he must supply as well the search for coherence within apparent chaos, something to fill the "holes" in the text (whether the dashes or asterisks or missing chapters or interrupted conversations). Finally, he must participate in the play of time that controls the vectors of all the discourses within the novel-of Tristram writing desperately in an effort to outdistance death in Book V and Yorick completing the novel from the position of death itself. Yorick is the figure whose mortality marks the boundaries of the Shandean world.
The characters try to "speak of death" as they mourn the "hole" Sterne's narrative of the subject in the process of constituting itself thus becomes an extended meditation on the reciprocal relations that so bind both author and reader under the sign of mortality. The "real" and the "fictive" interpenetrate; identification and analysis alternate. And thereby the novel can become a model for a certain kind of critical involvement and complicity in a "comedy of desire" (motley counterpart to Lacan's reading of Hamlet).
As Nietzsche shrewdly observed in his portrait of Sterne ("Der freieste Schriftsteller"),6 the secret of his art is a matter of Zweideutigkeit, a doubling back in double entendre, ambiguity, and rapid shifting of roles. He recognized Sterne's genius not only for implicating his readers in the game but for reversing parts with them in the dance of time; while we become spectators to our own performances:
Sterne is the great master of double entendre, this phrase being naturally used in a far wider sense than is commonly done when one applies it to sexual relations. We may give up for lost the reader who always wants to know exactly what Sterne thinks about a matter, and whether he be making a serious or a smiling face (for he can do both with one wrinkling of his features; he can be and even wishes to be right and wrong at the same moment, to interweave profundity and farce). His digressions are at once continuations and further developments of the story, his maxims contain a satire on all that is sententious, his dislike of seriousness is bound up with a disposition to take no matter merely externally and on the surface. So in the proper reader he arouses a feeling of uncertainty whether he be walking, lying, or standing, a feeling most closely akin to that of floating in the air. He, the most versatile of writers, communicates something of this versatility to his reader. Yes, Sterne unexpectedly changes the parts, and is often as much reader as author, his book being like a play within a play, a theatre audience before another theatre audience.
In this extraordinary versatility and in the ambiguous "wrinkling" (Faltung) of gaze with which he faces us lie two clues to the analytic power of Sterne's "mountebank" performance. This performance can only be completed, however, with the complicity of the reader.7
That the text must be relived, and thus completed, is the first assumption in Sterne's problematics of the novel. Yet as the text is being read, in all its meanderings, detours, and displacements, both author and readers are establishing a "position" that disposes those ambiguous relations, concatenating events, and intersecting times and places so deliberately skewed in the original. The reciprocating interplay of readings and readers, time and arrest, "imaginary" and "symbolic" gives us a model for the interpretative act and, thereby, the invention of a new time-that of the interpretation: first, a naive, open, and "participatory" reading, like that of the generous Trim, tracing-diachronically-the "digressive, progressive" course of the narrative; then a paradoxically synchronic "reading" of the "hidden" elements and reconstituted structures in their dialectical relations, not unlike Walter Shandy at work on the differentials of language; and finally, a synthetic rereading of both, like that of the author comprehending the life he has discovered, a movement turning in the familiar critical circle back to the marbled page that begins, ends, and emblematizes the book. Those other physically intercalated pages, at once signifiers and signifieds, the potential blank one and the completely determined black one, remain as troubling reminders of the two kinds of absence that always escape the asymptote of the critical reading.
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